Right of way in the sky: two problems in aircraft self-separation and the auction-based solution.
There has been a growing movement to give commercial airliners more freedom in choosing their routes and responsibility for detecting and avoiding conflicts. These "free flight" concepts must contain new rules for assigning right of way in potential conflict situations. To evaluate the effect of prospective rules, the current paper derives the expected response of agents who exhibit different levels of sophistication. Traditional game theoretic analysis is used to derive the behavior of rational agents. Computer simulations are used to predict the behavior of boundedly rational reinforcement learners. The results reveal that several seemingly reasonable, straightforward right-of-way rules might lead to undesirable outcomes. These problematic results are robust to the assumed level of rationality. It is shown that these problems can be alleviated by using auctions to resolve competition for right of way. Actual or potential applications of this research include the usage of second price auctions to address right-of-way and similar conflicts.